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Community participation in rural electrification 
Executive summary 
The experience in South Africa 
ii 
Within the broad context of rural development, community-based organisations (CBOs) are 
perceived as the elixir to ensure sustainability and empowerment. Projects justify the 
development of such organisations because of benefits ranging from cost reduction to 
community participation. Within a rural electrification programme there are potential gains 
associated with devolving certain functions, such as operation, maintenance and administration 
(OMA), to CBOs, but in South Africa there is relatively little experience of establishing CBOs to 
fulfil these functions in the electrification programme. Where some of these functions have been 
devolved to local communities in the South African electrification programme, the main reason 
for this has been the desire for cost savings. Two types of CBOs have been established by 
Eskom: the first, and more common arrangement, has been the devolution of certain OMA 
functions - ·most notably revenue collection and management, to vending agents. The second 
type of CBO, electricity agencies, have been established in both solar and 2.SA current limited 
supply electrification pilot projects, and have seen more functions being devolved, including 
revenue collection and management, maintenance, disconnections and new connections, user 
education, and marketing and promotion of electricity. 
Lessons from the experience 
One of the main problems facing Eskom is ensuring the financial accountability of local 
vendeing agents and electricity agencies. Vending agents roll over (or 'borrow') money and end 
up in debt. Part of the problem is that the systems to support financial accountability have not 
been well established. Another problem is that there are too few Eskom staff members to 
supervise the vendors. In the Northern Province, there has also been a large staff tum-over, 
making it difficult to establish good relationships with vendors. 
The Mafefe Electricity Agency, established in one of the 2.SA current-limited supply projects, 
has been criticised on the basis that it was not established in a transparent manner, that it lacks 
legitimacy in the community and is almost impossible to 'keep' accountable. Research 
undertaken found that there was virtually no knowledge amongst people generally of the 
Electricity Agency that was to be established in Mafefe. There was little participation in defining 
the nature of the organisation, how it would relate to other organisations or what roles and 
functions it would play. As a result, power struggl~ in the community were exacerbated and it 
has proved difficult to ensure accountability. '' 
A number of problems with the quality of service provided by the electricity agencies have 
arisen, mostly as a result of poor communication between Eskom, the agencies and community 
members. Problems have been experienced with the quality of service given by the vending 
agents. As people are generally appointed on the basis of their business skills they are not 
equipped to deal with customer complaints and queries. Furthermore, it was found that training 
of the electricity agency members had not occurred. 
Establishing sustainable CBOs 
Sustainability versus self-sustaining 
Perhaps the most important insight to inform this work is that the concept of sustainability of 
CBOs does not mean that they are self-sustaining. In other words, external inputs are essential 
to effective operation of community-based organisation. This means that effort should be made 
to define the types of interaction and assistance which is required for long-term viability, rather 
than being concerned with how to enable CBOs to operate without any external inputs. Eskom, 
or any future electricity utility, cannot absolve itself from responsibility for ensuring that an 
agent is able to fulfil his/her responsibilities as support and supervision are essential: regular 
meetings, appropriate accounting systems, regular reconciliation of the books and revenue 
collected and training of the agent should be facilitated. 
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Community mechanisms to ensure accountability 
There are a number of ways in which communities can· be involved in keeping CBOs 
accountable. It is not sufficient just to involve communities in the election of people to these 
positions. Constituting a higher decision-making authority, such as an annual general meeting 
or a board, are ways of involving community members. Although important, it is also clear that 
these mechanisms do not necessarily guarantee that the organisation will be accountable. 
Success is largely dependent on the capacity of community members to participate actively in 
this task. The establishment of transparent rules and the provision of sufficient and appropriate 
information will assist in this task. 
Incentives to participate 
The provision of incentives to participate in CBOs was observed to be important in the long-run 
sustainability of these organisations, as people participate on the basis of gains and benefits. In 
other sectors, such as the provision of water to rural areas, cash incentives have been used to 
stimulate the efficacy of CBOs. Volunteer positions often place a burden on people as the 
responsibilities, time and effort outweighed the benefits of being involved. 
Power relations within CBO 
Communities are not homogenous: social relations of power, such as gender and class, 
differentiate community members and CBOs most often reproduce the social stratifications in 
that community. In other words, positions of power are more than likely to be occupied by . 
wealthier, more powerful individuals (usually men). While it is important to include marginal 
groups, such as women and poorer people, capacity building strategies to ensure that they are 
able to contribute equally with other CBO members must also be put in place. 
Implications for the electricity utility 
One of the major implications of building CBOs is that fieldstaff have to become facilitators and 
organisers, work which is traditionally associated with unions and NGOs. To institute a practice 
which will build the capacity of CBOs to fulfil operation and administrative functions in rural 
communities is a difficult task for an electricity utility due to its organisational culture and form. 
We would propose that Eskom, or the future electricity utility, does not constitute electricity 
agencies which devolve a wide range of functions; rather, we would recommend that Eskom 
subcontracts these functions to an organisation, such as an NGO, which has the organisational 
culture and skills to support CBOs. Eskom would retain its marketing function and controls over 
revenue collection. However, there does seem to be the possibility of continuing to establish 
and improve the sustainability, accountability and efficacy of vending agents. It is worthwhile 
stressing that the restructuring of the electricity distribution industry offers an opportunity to shift 
the practice of the technical delivery of electricity to prioritise and resource an investment in 
human development, through improving the approach to delivery as well as emphasising the 
need to build the capacity of rural people. 
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2. 1 The Mafefe Electricity Agency4 
The establishment of an electricity agency was one of the components of the 2.SA pilot project 
at Mafefe in the Northern Province, whereby the Agency was to perform certain 'customer 
service' and maintenance functions on behalf of Eskom. The benefit to the 'community' of such 
an arrangement would arise from 'the fact that they will have full participation in all matters 
· concerning electricity in their village' (Eskom 1995, emphasis added). Furthermore, a '24 hour 
maintenance service' would be provided to the people of Mafefe, and, in addition, the Agency 
would perform all functions necessary for revenue management on behalf of Eskom. 
The structure and governance of the Mafefe Agency 
Defining the structure of the Mafefe Agency is not an easy task, because of the ambiguous 
boundaries between the various parties involved, as well as the conflation of governance and 
operational roles. Figure 1 sets the Electricity Agency staff apart from the Electricity Committee, 
the Tribal Authority and the Kgoshi - although this separation does not exist in reality. Both the 
Kgoshi and Electricity Committee are implicated in the Agency: Eskom negotiated the contract 
with the Maf efe Electricity Committee and the Kgoshi signed the Agency contract with Eskom 
on behalf of the Mafefe community. 
The Electricity Committee plays the management role in the Agency and employs the 
personnel of the Agency. In the contractual agreement with Eskom it was suggested that three 
full-time staff members be employed by the Mafefe Agency: one low-voltage official, one low-
voltage assistant official and one clerk. However, four people are employed - two 
administration clerks and two maintenance officials. The jobs were advertised at Maf efe and 
Eskom was not involved in the selection process, which was carried out by the Electricity 
Committee. The maintenance officials had previously worked on the electrification project and 
were appointed to their current position because they were the best two workers. Agency staff 
are paid monthly salaries by the Electricity Committee. 
A range of operational functions are undertaken by the Electricity Committee. For instance, it 
informed people about changes in tariffs, such as the increase in the flat rate tariff. When the 
Agency staff receive complaints they direct them to the Committee, which also deals with 
problems of non-payment. Liaison with Eskom 'about disconnections or any other customer 
complaints is undertaken by the Committee and not the Agency staff. 
4 Most of the information in this section is from the pre-electrification research undertaken by Cecile Thom 
(1996) and the post-electrification research undertaken by Marlett Wentzel and the Land Reform Research 
Group (1997). In addition to this, interviews with Eskom employees who have had experience of the 
Mafefe Electricity Agency were undertaken and the Mafefe Electricity Agency contract (Eskom 1995) was 
examined. 
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Figure 1: Mafefe Electricity Agency 
The responsibility for ensuring that the Mafefe Electricity Agency fulfils its contractual 
obligations and remains accountable lies with the Kgoshi. The reasons which led to the Kgoshi 
signing the contract was Eskom's need to enter into an agreement with a legal entity (Thom 
1998), as well as the assumption that the Kgoshi's position and status would automatically 
ensure that accm~ntability and authority would be vested with,the Agency. 
Eskom also played a role in ensuring that the Agency was fulfilling its responsibilities. However, 
because of the high turnover of Eskom staff in this area of work, this function was not 
performed consistently. There is no other autl)ority, such as a board or annual general 
community meeting, which would oversee the op,~ration of the Agency. 
The role of the Mafefe Electricity Agency 
The Agency entered a contractual agreement with Eskom to provide the following functions: 
1. Revenue collection 
• reading meters of customers and forwarding the information to Eskom, which in turn 
prepares accounts which are given to the Agency to distribute; 
• ensuring that the people pay their electricity accounts; 
• accepting electricity payments on behalf of Eskom; 
• maintaining an accounting system of payments received; 
• banking monies received on a weekly basis; 
• informing Eskom about cases of non-payment; and 
• reporting to Eskom on a monthly basis. 
2. Maintenance 
• reporting all HV system faults to Eskom in Steelpoort; 
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• low-voltage system maintenance, including replacing faulty circuit breakers and meters, 
replacing damaged service conductors and poles; 
• keeping a limited amount of stock for repairs; and 
• reporting to Eskom on a monthly basis. 
3. Disconnections and connections 
• connecting new households; and 
• disconnecting those households which have not paid, on the instruction of Eskom via the 
Electricity Committee. 
4. Complaints and enquiries 
• following up complaints and enquiries. 
5. Education 
• providing advice on the safe and efficient use of electricity; 
• giving advice on the use of electricity to people with a 2.5A supply, particularly with 
regard to ensuring that their electricity supply does not trip; 
• providing advice to households on the most effective way to do house wiring; and 
• dealing with any problems around electricity experienced by households; 
6. Marketing and promotion 
• promoting the use of electricity rather than fuelwood to ensure that 'nature can be 
conserved' (Eskom 1995: 5); 
• educating people about the cost-saving potential of using electricity, rather than paraffin 
and gas, for lighting; and 
• holding promotional days or functions to educate people at Mafefe, creating awareness 
of electricity and electrical appliances. 
2.2 Tambo village electricity cigent5 
In addition to Mafefe, the viability of implementipg a 2.SA supply of electricity was tested at 
Tambe village in the Eastern Cape. Devolving reyenue collection and certain customer service 
functions to the local level was also a componentof the Tambe village project. Initially the idea 
of electricity stokvels6 with elected metering corrimittees which reported to the Tambe village 
development committee was introduced as a way of establishing local responsibility for revenue 
management. This idea· was rejected. by the community due to the inherent inequality of the 
system where all members of an electricity stokvel would pay the same for electricity regardless 
of the amount they used (James 1996). It was decided to appoint an individual as an agent to 
collect revenue, inform Eskom of non-/payments and technical problems. The agent who was 
appointed was nominated because he had been trained by Eskom as a community-based 
'sparky' or electrician. He was elected at a community meeting. 
The role of the local agent 
The local agent at Tambe was appointed to: 
5 
6 
• collect monthly flat rate payments from 2.5A households; 
• issue receipts for payment; 
This section will draw largely on the work undertaken by James (1996), and James and Ntutela (1997). 
Stokvels refer to organisations which arose in poor black communities during apartheid times. Based on a 
principle of collective action they are designed to save money and offer credit to its members in times of 
need. 
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• present copies of receipts to the Eskom Sales and Customer Service (SACS) office in 
Queenstown; 
• inform the Eskom Queenstown depot and Elektrowise officers of any problems which 
people were experiencing with their electricity supply; and 
• inform the workers from the Electrical Services Department of Public Works in Dongwe 
of any technical problems when they visited Tambe. 
Although it was initially thought that the revenue collector would also perform some 
maintenance functions, this was not included in the final job description. The revenue collector 
was elected at a community meeting to perform this function, for which he was paid R400 per 
month by Eskom. Figure 2 shows the lines of responsibility and reporting of the Tambe agent. 
The Eskom SACS office in Queenstown was responsible for processing payments and customer 
services. Close communication between the local revenue collector and the SACS office senior 
clerk was e~sential. On receipt of proof of household payments from the revenue collector, the 
senior clerk entered the information into the system. Initially payment had to be made by the 
5th of every month to avoid being disconnected. Disconnection lists were generated according 
to the payment information received. · 








faults & complaints 
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Figure 2: Tambo electricity agent 
Once people had paid their debt, usually comprising one month's electricity tariff plus a 
reconnection fee of R30, they were eligible for reconnection. 
Disconnection and reconnection of households were the responsibility of the Queenstown 
depot maintenance office and the maintenance staff of the electrical section of the Public Works 
Department in Dongwe. The SACS clerk informed the Eskom depot in Queenstown of 
households which had to be either disconnected or reconnected. This information would then 
be relayed to the Dongwe maintenance team who would go to Tambe (usually early in the 
morning), check with the local agent for any reported faults or problems, attend to them 
immediately, and also cut off defaulters and reconnect those who had paid their debt. 
A remote disconnect system, which obviated the need to be physically present in order to 
disconnect households, was eventually implemented. However, this was short-lived, as a 
directive from MegaWatt Park in late 1997 resulted in all Tambe village residents being 
upgraded to a 20A supply, and the potential to establish whether a remote disconnect system is 
effective was removed. · 
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2.3 Supporting community entrepreneurs: vending agents and 
customer service representatives 
Apart from the agency at Mafefe and the agent at Tambe, Eskom has established other 
mechanisms to support the devolution to communities of certain OMA functions - most notably 
revenue collection and management, through the establishment of vending agents. 
A less common, yet interesting, institutional mechanism has been the establishment of close 
corporations by the Eskom SACs office in Vereeniging, which undertakes both revenue 
collection and other customer service functions on behalf of Eskom. The development and 
support of local entrepreneurs underlies the establishment of both vending agents and customer 
service representatives. This section draws on interviews with regional Eskom staff from the 
Gauteng, Northern Province and KwaZulu/Natal. Although not all regions were visited, 
common themes emerged from interviews, especially with regard to the difficulty of ensuring 
financial accountability. Despite the predominantly urban character of the customers serviced 
by the Vereeniging SACs office, interviews with its staff were included in the research because 
of their successful establishment of vending agents and customer service representatives. The 
insights of the Vereeniging staff will be explored in relation to their applicability in rural areas. 
Vending agents 
Rationale for establishing vending agents 
Vending agents (Figure 3) were initially established by Eskom in 1992 in response to the shift in 
its customer base and the uncertainty of the distribution licence agreement which granted 
access to these areas. Rather than employ people and run the risk of having to deal with a 
redundant workforce in the event of Eskom losing its licence in these areas, it was decided to 
devolve the revenue collection function to community members. With the cost-saving 
advantages of establishing electricity agents these agents were set up in both urban townships 
and rural areas where both pre-payment and conventional metering systems had installed. In 
some regions, this strategy has produced inadvertent benefits. The introduction of vending 
agents has the potential to reduce the operational costs of electrification, as well as to create 
jobs. However, as discussed below, these outcomE!S are not inevitable, and depend on a range 
of factors, including training, support, and monitoring of financial systems. 
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Figure 3: Vending agent 
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The role of the vending agent 
Vending agents enter into a contractti.al agreement with Eskom to fulfil certain functions 
pertaining to the collection of revenue and the sale of electricity. These include: 
• the sale of tokens for cash only at particular hours stipulated in a contract. The times 
when the vending agent is to operate is often included in the contractual agreement in 
order to ensure a particular level of customer service (Eskom n.d.) as well as to enable 
control over the agents; 
• ensuring the safe-keeping and appropriate use of Eskom's vending equipment; 
• notifying Eskom of any loss or damage of money, tokens or equipment; 
• depositing money into Eskom's bank account at a time (daily, weekly, specific date) 
specified in the contract - this function is not always performed by vending agents and in 
some areas'is undertaken by the Protection Services or Fidelity Guards; 
• keeping records of transactions, reconcile sales and provide documentary support for 
them; 
• providing, in some cases, a conduit for Eskom's marketing ·materials, by displaying and 
distributing the materials. 
In the case of agents selling electricity cards or tokens for the pre-payment meters, Eskom 
provides, installs and maintains the vending equipment. Vending agents are trained by Eskom 
in the use of equipment, banking and reconciliation. Stationery, electricity cards/tokens and 
banking documentation required is provided by Eskom. In instances where agents are 
responsible for 'marketing', materials are provided by Eskom. 
The operation of the vending agent 
An agent may enter into the contractual agreement either as an individual or as a company. 
Where Eskom pays the commission owed to the vending agent to a company, tax is not 
deducted by Eskom. Generally, though, the vending agents are individuals who, for tax 
purposes, are regarded as part-time employees of Eskom. Thus, although Eskom is liable for 
individual vending agent PAYE deductions, the agent does not enjoy any of the benefits, such 
as medical aid, or security, associated with being employed for a company such as Eskom. 
Agents are usually paid a basic fee plus the commission on their banked electricity sales. 
Clearly, the larger the customer base, the greater the commission for the agent. In the instance 
where there are shortfalls in the amount banked, money is deducted from the agent's fee. 
Agents have to provide for their own security. Contracts are usually renewable every year. 
Although the process for agency selection varies from region to region, there are commonalties 
in the approach; In Vereeniging, close interaction with the civics and other community leaders 
was central to the .selection. Positions were advertised in the community and people were 
elected by the community to apply to Eskom. The criteria for selection emphasised business 
and entrepreneurial skills. In some areas spaza owners are considered to be good candidates, 
especially given Eskom's reluctance to invest in infrastructure (de Villiers 1998). In others, more 
'formal' shop-owners are preferred (Simmonds 1998). 
In the Northern Province Eskom liases with the chief and other structures if appropriate. Mass 
meetings are held, at which at least three people are nominated. They are then interviewed by 
Eskom and one is appointed as the vending agent (Baloyi 1998). Once vending agents have 
been selected Eskom ensures that they are trained to meet their obligations. 
In all regions there are contractual stipulations which limit the amount of money which vending 
agents may hold without banking or putting it into a safe. For instance, in the areas serviced by 
the Vereeniging office, every vending machine has a limit of R2000. This is the way of limiting 
risk. Once a vendor has reached R2000 s/he must 'drop safe' the money in the large safes 
which Eskom has made available to the vendors. Fidelity Guards pick up the money every 
second day (de Villiers 1998; Moiloe 1998). 
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In some areas of the Northern Province, collections by Fidelity Guards takes place once a week, 
but in others vending agents have to deposit money in the bank. The limit on money held in 
the Northern Province is Rl200. According to Baloyi (1998) there are always 'difficulties' when 
money changes hands: 'there are always excuses'. 
Close corporations: community customer service representatives 
The rationale for establishing community customer service representatives 
Community customer service representatives (Figure 4) were established by Eskom in the 
Vereeniging townships as part of a political move to gain support and credibility. During the 
late 1980s and early 1990s townships such as Evaton, Orange Farm and Sebokeng were 
considered no-go areas and it was impossible for Eskom to operate in them: equipment was 
stolen, contractors were threatened and negotiations took place at gunpoint. Eskom was 
accused of not contributing to job creation. As a result, through long and protracted 
negotiations, two close corporations (CCs) were established, aiming to devolve certain 
customer service functions with the hope of building entrepreneurial skills: Banaliswe, which 
employs 15 people and services 25 000 customers, and Banganani, which employs 25 people 
and services 27 000 customers. · 
The role of the customer service representatives 
According to a contractual agreement (Eskom n.d.) the CCs are responsible for: 
• verification of meter readings; 
• distribution of electricity accounts to customers with conventional meters; 
• distribution of education, information, marketing and promotional pamphlets; 
• attending to customer complaints and queries; and 
• dealing with ad hoc requests . 
The CC is appointed to fulfil these functions in the capacity of a contractor and not an Eskom 
employee. Eskom is contractually obliged to provide training for CC employees. However, 
Eskom is able to determine the 'nature and extent of the training'7 (Eskom n.d.). 
Payment to the CC is made on the basis of verifiable actions with each function having a 
commission attached to it. Fees include R0.20 per pamphlet delivered, Rl0.50 for reporting 
defects, and R65.00 for reporting verifiable bridged meters (Eskom n.d.). During the month in 
which the interviews for this study occurred, R23 ,000 and R26 000 were paid to Banaliswe and 
Banganani respectively. An Electrowise advisor is attached to each CC, providing support, 
training and guidance where necessary. 
Although this does not seem to have effected the efficacy of the CCs, this clause has the potential to 
provide Eskom with the opportunity to breach the contract. 
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Figure 4: Close corporation 
2.4 Problems which have been experienced 
Ensuring financial accountability 
One of the main problems facing Eskom is ensuring the financial accountability of local revenue 
collectors. At Tambo, the agent allegedly disappeared with R2000 of the revenue which he had 
collected from 2.SA customers on behalf of Eskom. The situation at Tambo is useful in that it 
serves to question the notion that the selection of an individual through a democratic process 
will necessarily ensure the accountability of that person. It is important to devise Jl1echanisms 
which ensure that both Eskom and the community hold this individual accountable. Power 
vested in community structure5 and general me~tings which oversee the agent are potential 
ways of enabling the community members to ke~p the agent accountable. In order for Eskom 
to hold the agent accountable it is necessary to interact with the agent in a manner which 
provides checks and balances, as well as support. 
Similar findings apply to the establishment of vending agents. In both the Northern Province 
and Mpumalanga keeping vending agents financially accountable has been. problem (Baloyi 
1998; Kinner 1998). Vending agents roll over (or 'borrow') money and end up in debt. Part of 
the problem is that the systems to support financial accountability have not been well 
established. 
Another problem is that there are too few Eskom staff members to supervise the vendors. In the 
Northern Province, there has also been a large staff tum-over, making it difficult to establish 
good relationships with vendors. 
One of the biggest problems in the Northern Province is that bank statements are not reconciled 
properly. Sometimes, the fault lies with Eskom, when inaccuracies in the reconcilliations are not 
picked up, payments are delayed, or when there are inaccuracies in the Eskom reconciliation 
validations. This has resulted in strained relations between Eskom and the vending agents, and 
in one instance 'Eskom failed to pay the commission to agent as the validator had done the 
reconciliatio'n incorrectly. For this reason the agent took money from the sale of the electricity 
cards' (Baloyi 1998). 
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The situation in Vereeniging is in contrast to this. Perhaps, one of the key factors which 
contributes towards the financial accountability8 of the vending agents in the Vereeniging area 
is the existence of Eskom revenue 'controllers' who supervise the agents and visit them every 
day. The supervisors check that the bank deposit correlates with the summary from the vending 
machine. Vending agents are under obligation to ensure that reconciliation is done every single 
day to avoid their rolling-over money (de Villiers 1998). A similar system has been set up in 
Mpumalanga where 'vending controllers' visit the vendors in the Bushbuck Ridge area, 
although Fidelity Guards are responsible for this function in other areas of Mpumalanga 
(Simmonds 1998). 
Where the Vereeniging office is unable to implement this system of control it will not establish 
vending agents. For instance, in one of the rural areas serviced by the Vereeniging office, a 
small community with fewer than 500 customers is serviced by a mobile vending agent going 
around every day for half a day (de Villiers 1998). 
There is clearly a genuine desire on the part of many Eskom managers to build entrepreneurial 
skills and create jobs. In some instances, however, the experience tends to belie this aim. 'To 
what extent are these agents empowered? Most ended up in jail or owing lots of money' (Baloyi 
1998). In other areas, the establishment of vending agents has been successful and valuable 
lessons have been learnt on how to achieve sustainability, which includes measures to secure 
financial accountability. 
Questions around the financial viability of the Electricity Agency were also raised by Thom in 
her pre-electrification study (1996). Although difficult to validate, on a recent trip to Mafefe an 
Eskom staff member was told that no more connections were taking place because there was 
no money to do so ( Geldenhuys 1998). Together with the costs associated with operation, 
administration and maintenance the fixed monthly fee paid to the Agency was also supposed to 
provide for the purchasing of materials which· would enable more households to receive an 
electricity connection. Without undertaking research into this, it is difficult to determine exactly 
where the problem lies. One reason may rest with the fact that the monthly payment was 
calculated on three employees only. However, without an indication of the wages of the 
Agency employees, this remains speculative. This does raise serious questions about the 
financial viability of the Agency. · 
Legitimacy, transparency and accountability 
The Mafefe Electricity Agency has been criticised<:on the basis that it was not established in a 
transparent manner, that it lacks legitimacy and is almost impossible to 'keep' accountable. In 
the pre-electrification study undertaken at Mafefe Thom reported that there 'was virtually no 
knowledge amongst people generally of the Electricity Agency that was to be established in 
Mafefe' (1996: 66). The proposal for an Agency had been discussed only by the TLC and 
possibly the Tribal Authority, although 'it seemed that it had not been discussed in any depth 
with either of these bodies' (71). Most people expected Eskom to fulfil the functions that were 
to be contracted to the Agency. Thus, there was little participation in defining the nature of the 
organisation, how it would relate to other organisations or what roles and functions it would 
play. These findings were corroborated by Wentzel et al (1997) in their post-electrification 
study. Residents of Mafefe, as well as the committees aligned to the ANC and the democratic 
local government were ill-informed about the functions of the Mafefe Electricity Agency. 
Further, the process of appointing the Agency staff was not known by the majority of residents, 
nor was the fact that the Agency is being paid from income derived from electricity payments. 
In a deeply divided community, such as Mafefe, it is a problem that the Tribal Authority, 
Electricity Committee and Electricity Agency are so closely intertwined. This has led to 
In five years that they have been operating Eskom has terminated the contract of one vending agent only. 
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questions about the legitimacy of the Electricity Agency, especially from other factions in the 
community (Wentzel et al 1997 and Thom 1996). · 
It is almost impossible to ensure accountability of the Electricity Agency, either to 'the 
community'9 or to Eskom. Based on assumptions about his status (that it has authority and that 
he is accountable to the community), Eskom signed the contract with the Kgoshi. However, as 
Thom (1996) argues, it is unlikely that Agency accountability can be vested in the Kgoshi given 
the complex power relations and deep divisions which exist in the community. Richard Baloyi 
( 1998), the Electrification planning manager for Eskom in the Northern Province corroborates 
this point of view: 
It was wrong for Eskom to appoint the chief. At a political level it is impossible to keep 
the chief accountable as he can mobilise his subjects and Eskom will not be able to do 
very much. 
The effective management of the Agency, as well as its legitimacy in and accountability to the 
community.is contingent on all interest groups being involved in the process of establishing an 
agency (Thom 1996). In a context, such as Mafefe, where struggles over control over 
development resources and power are prevalent, it is not difficult to understand that the lack of 
information, or the dissemination of partial or ambiguous information is one strategy for 
maintaining power. So, if the people of Mafefe do not know how the Agency is constituted or 
what its roles are, or who will fulfil its responsibilities, it is unlikely that anything will be 
challenged. Where there is not a strong tradition of democratic decision-making or where the 
power is exercised in oppressive ways, such a strategy is likely to remain unchallenged. 
It is essential that CBOs are established with full knowledge of the different groupings, power 
struggles and conflicts which exist in the community, and that the process through which these 
organisations are established is democratic, transparent and inclusive. 
Providing a good service 
A number of problems with the quality of service provided by the agents have arisen. At 
Tambo, many of these problems can be attributed to poor communication between the 
community members, who were faced· with disconnection or other technical and maintenance 
problems, and Eskom. This, in tum, was largely a result of the inadequate way in which the 
local revenue collector fulfilled the role of facilitating communication between the users and 
Eskom. The problems facing community members led to many accusations and recriminations 
being made. Most people blamed Eskom for problems with their electricity supply, even if the 
fault lay with the agent (James & Ntutela 1997). '· 
Problems have been experienced with the quality of service given by the vending agents. As 
people are generally appointed on the basis of their business skills they are not equipped to 
deal with customer complaints and queries. The ability to deal with people in an appropriate 
manner should be included as one of the criteria for appointing vending agents, who should 
also be trained to deal with people and be equipped with information which could assist people 
in getting their problems resolved. 
Apart from low voltage maintenance, buying appliances and making payments at the Agency's 
office, the post-electrification study found that the Mafefe Electricity Agency was not providing 
any other service to the community members. The study specifically highlighted the fact that 
there was no attempt to provide information on the safety aspects of electricity use, as well as 
appliance and general use of a 2.SA electricity supply (Wentzel et al 1997). However, it is 
important to question whether it is reasonable to expect the Agency to fulfil the responsibilities 
outlined in the contract without the necessary support and training. 
9 The 'community' is not an unproblematic concept. It is impossible to speak of community as a 
homogenous group of people with similar aspirations, needs and priorities. 
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Although Eskom is contractually bound to ensure that the Agency staff are trained, only the 
maintenance staff have been trained. The administration clerks have not been trained by 
Eskom and have been taught some bookkeeping skills by a person from the school. Given this, 
it is hardly surprising that the Agency is unable to meet its other contractual obligations. The 
Tambe agent was also not trained. 
Many of the functions outlined in the contract are perhaps not appropriate for an organisation 
of this nature. This is especially true of the marketing and promotion functions which ostensibly 
exist to promote the interests of the utility through the sale of electricity. The Agency is not 
employed by Eskom, and it cannot be expected to promote Eskom's business. Rather, the 
Agency should provide for the needs of the community members of Maf efe. 
Job creation and supporting entrepreneurs 
Contracting out services to vending agents or customer service representatives is controversial. 
The fact that contractors are not full-time staff, and therefore do not enjoy the benefits of full-
time employment (medical aid, pension, housing subsidies) is at the centre of the controversy. 
Many people in Eskom feel that it is appropriate to contract ou_t these services as it builds 
entrepreneurial and business skills, while others consider it unethical to contract out services, as 
the move is largely motivated by the desire to save costs. It is felt that Eskom has an obligation 
to contribute towards job creation. 
What Eskom is actually doing is avoiding the real cost but they want the real benefit. To 
greater extent people have been robbed of their surplus labour by not giving them 
benefits. If we want to contribute to employment or unemployment. Not protected in 
terms of labour relations act. Desperation of people is exploited. (Baloyi 1998) 
On speaking to a few of the agents in Vereeniging, it was evident that they felt that it would be 
better to be employed because they would receive benefits. They did acknowledge that they 
had developed skills and that a number of vendors and customer service representatives had 
formed their own businesses once they had built their entrepreneurial skills. Some of the 
vending agents had expanded to include telecommunication centres also. 
Do agents and representatives offer cost-reduction 10 
Devolving certain revenue management and customer service functions has the potential to 
reduce the costs of electrification. However, this::cannot be achieved in a hands off manner. 
There is a need to develop systems which support revenue agents, which may mean that 
appropriate people have to be employed to fulfiFvarious functions, such as controlling revenue 
collection. If the revenue collection agencies, together with the support system, operate 
effectively cost savings can be achieved. For instance, de Villiers (1998) provides a rough 
estimate of the cost savings which have been achieved in Vereeniging through the 
establishment of customer service representatives and vending agents: 
It is a cost effective mechanism which has cut costs by a quarter of a million rand per 
annum. We don't have to pay salaries, rent cars etc. There are 28 service centres and 4 
people in each would have to have been employed by Eskom - this is a huge amount. 
Agents represent one tenth of a situation where Eskom would be responsible for 
employment. 
However, the perspective is not as optimistic in other regions. Theft by agents is a detracting 
factor; the extent to which it has an impact on costs will be determined in the cost analysis 
which will be undertaken by Gillian Simmonds. 
IO See the work undertaken by Gillian Simmonds (1998) which attempts to do a cost analysis of 
implementing electricity agents. 
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Summary 
Although the organisational forms of the Mafefe Electricity Agency, the Tambo Electricity 
Agent, the vending agents and the close corporations are very different, there are important 
similarities. The assumption that people will be accountable by virtue of their status (such as the 
Kgoshi in Mafefe) or a democratically elected process is often made by Eskom, with the result 
that there are no other mechanisms within the community which could facilitate the 
accountability of organisations. The checks and balances which do exist (such as in 
Vereeniging) lie in the hands of Eskom and manifest themselves as tight control over financial 
accounting. One of the fundamental differences between the approach adopted in the pilot 
projects at Tambo and Mafefe and the approach to the vending agents and customer service 
representatives in Vereeniging is the system of support which is given to these organisations. In 
the pilot projects, devolution of these functions meant that Eskom had a 'hands-off' approach, 
while in Vereeniging devolution was accompanied by a strong system of support and training. 
3 Other experience: rural electrification and water 
sector CBOs 
Discussions 01;1 rural electrification, whether grid or off-grid, are pre-occupied with costs, 
financial viability, institutional arrangements, and the economic and social impacts of 
interventions. Unfortunately, there is little written of the experience of devolving rural 
electrification functions and establishing CBOs in rural electrification programmes. Where such 
programmes have aimed to enhance local people's capacity or ensure participation, 
information is presented in a descriptive, rather than analytical manner - mentioning, for 
example, that local CBOs are established, or that their involvement has led to the success of 
certain interventions. However, the issues which have led to the success or failure of these 
CBOs are not always examined. This section will attempt to distil the key issues which have 
emerged in the rural electrification literature, which is predominantly concerned with rural 
electrification co-operatives or with community organisation in renewable energy projects, 
although rural electrification co-operatives have functions which are beyond the scope of CBOs 
which could be implemented in South Africa 
3. 1 Rural electricity co-operat!~es 
Policies promoting local participation, together ~Jth the difficulty of reaching people who lived 
far from the centrally provided power led to the establishment of rural electrification co-
operatives in countries such as the United States, Germany and Sweden. In the United States 
rural electrification co-operatives have been in existence since the 1930s. This has led to a 
situation where rural electricity distribution is locally managed. While rural co-operatives have 
been successful in these countries, the situation in Third World countries has been mixed. 
Spurred on largely by the success of rural co-operatives in the United States the National Rural 
Electric Co-operative Association (NRECA) has been instrumental in promoting co-operatives, 
especially in Asia and South America. Operating in vastly different contexts, these rural 
electrification co-operatives have mainly been implemented as a means of reducing the costs of 
providing electricity services in new areas. Coupled with this, assumptions that rural 
electrification co-operatives would increase the pace of development were also made ( Gerger & 
Gullberg 1997). 
Gerger and Gullberg ( 1997) show that rural electrification co-operatives established in areas 
where grid electricity is available have purchased bulk power, as well as managed the 
distribution of electricity in a specific locality. In areas where the grid is not extended, rural 
electricity co-operatives have also been involved in the generation of electricity, for example, 
through diesel sets or micro-hydro systems. Co-operatives vary in size. In Bangladesh, for 
example, each electrification co-operative serves a population of between 500 000 and 
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1500000 (Smith 1995), while the number of customers of the Bolivian co-operatives included 
in one study ranged from 262 to 161 000. Although the situation varies, co-operatives also 
usually undertake operation, maintenance and administration functions. In Nepal these 
included gathering and submitting applications for connections, organising the contribution of 
local materials (poles and labour), collecting periodic bills and fees from customers, routine 
control and maintenance, acting as a communication link between the generation company 
and the community, arranging meetings, organising training courses for potential local 
entrepreneurs, and maintaining pipelines, power house and purchase of spare parts. In some 
areas the management of meter reading and billing is also included as one of their roles. 
Management of the rural electricity co-operatives 
Although the management of co-operatives varies from one co-operative to the next, measures 
to ensure accountability are an inherent part of the system. For the most part accountability is 
based on democratic practices. For example, co-operative members (members of the 
community ·who have an electricity supply) of the Co-operative Electrica Yungas in Bolivia elect 
delegates to attend a 'meeting of delegates' once a year. Every three years, at this meeting five 
Directors are elected, who in tum elect the General Manager. The General Manager contracts 
the employees of the co-operative and Directors are responsible for informing the community 
members of the co-operative activities. The management framework is stipulated in the co-
operative bye-laws which are enforced by the electricity utility ENDA and the NRECA. These 
bye-laws state the purpose and role of the co-operative, its employees, general meetings and 
administration council, as well as the rights and obligations of the co-operative members. 'The 
members are requested to personally assist by voice and voting in the Zonal Meetings and 
Meeting of Delegates; and to redeem the commitments and commissions of the entrustees' 
(Gerger & Gullberg 1997: 43). In other words, although the utility enforces the bye-laws of the 
co-operative, the co-operative members have the role of ensuring that the co-operative is 
accountable and fulfils its function. 
Decision-making and 'supreme authority' is entrusted in an annual general meeting of co-
operative members where administration councils are elected. In some instance, such as the 
Mizque co-operative in Bolivia a 'vigilance committee' was also nominated and given authority 
to monitor the co-operative's activities. In India, co-operatives consist of members (every 
consumer is a member) and a Board which oversees the co-operative activities and makes 
policies and co-operative employees. General me~tings are also held. 
These examples represent a fundamental departuie from the approach followed in South Africa 
where there are no mechanisms for community (~ser) involvement in ensuring accountability of 
Community-based organisations in rural electrification. However, there is no guarantee that 
these mechanisms will lead to the effective management and operation of co-operatives. 
Gerger and Gullberg ( 1997) found that most co-operatives met with difficulties and 
experienced problems because of poor management and inadequate day-to-day maintenance. 
In Bolivia, the problem of inadequate training programmes was experienced during the 1970s 
when USAID and NRECA discontinued development assistance to the country, with the result 
that numerous rural electrification co-operatives experienced problems: poor accountancy; 
misuse of funds; weak co-operative leadership; and inappropriate technical maintenance. The 
Bolivian government did not attempt to step in and support the co-operatives. Many co-
operatives ceased to exist and were taken over by larger co-operatives of the utility. 
3.2 User organisations in rural electrification 
Another local institutional arrangement which is common in rural electrification projects, 
especially off-grid projects, is the village committee or user organisation. Although the functions 
of these two organisational forms overlap, user organisations differ from rural electrification co-
operatives in that they do not distribute electricity. Furthermor, user organisations are village-
based, whereas co-operatives are not necessarily confined to operate in one village. 
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To address the problems associated with electrifying rural areas in Nepal, such as the long 
distances which utility staff need to travel, it was decided to involve local communities in the 
construction and operation of their electricity systems. It was envisaged that this would reduce 
costs, administrative load .of the utility and unite the community and strengthen the 
'commitment to the project' (lversin n.d.). 
One of the criteria for a village to be considered for electrification was that its members form a 
User Organisation, established with the utility's assistance. The User Organisations fulfilled the 
following functions: 
• collecting new applications for connection and submitting them to the utility; 
• organising the contribution of local materials; especially poles and labour; 
• collecting revenue; 
• routine control and maintenance of distribution system; and 
• providing a communication link between the community ·and the utility. 
With the exception of the revenue collection function, the scope of responsibility of these 
organisations is similar to that of the electricity committees in South Africa. 
In cases where NRECA has been involved in the implementation of renewable energy projects, 
community organisation is considered to 'guarantee the sustainability of the each project 
through the active participation of its users' (Canek 1994: 6). In the selection of villages for 
project implementation, the existence of a community organisation 'representing the interests of 
the community' is considered essential. Further, success of renewable energy projects is 
considered to hinge on the devolution of responsibility to the community in order to avoid 
dependency: 'The target group will be made up of those people who wish to participate in the 
project and not of all the members of the community' (Canek 1994: 8). A 'mass' meeting of 
people interested in the project is organised. At this meeting a date is set for elections of the 
village project committee. Elections take place, with each position and its associated 
responsibilities carefully outlined prior to nominations. The project committees have the same 
accountability mechanisms as the co-operatives which have been established by NRECA. The 
General Meeting, which comprises all the usei:s and beneficiaries of the project, has the 
authority to approve budgets, income and expenditure and plans of the committee. Training of 
committee members takes place, and strict a~counting controls are instituted to ensure 
accountability to the users, . as well as to the~ financing institutions. The committee has 
responsibility for: "' 
.?t 
• representing the community to the institution providing the renewable energy by, for 
example, forwarding requests for service, or complaints; 
• managing the procedures regarding requests, contracts and claims to the energy 
provider; 
• managing the community fund, collecting revenue and dealing with payment defaulters; 
• looking after the store; and 
• controlling and regulating maintenance and use of systems. 
Similarly, in Mexico, potential beneficiary communities have to establish local electricity 
committees which submit formal applications to the utility. The local committees undertake to 
contribute towards the project as well as to maintain the systems (Cowan et al 1996). 
Most of the electricity systems (predominantly hydropower) in Nepal are managed (and 
sometimes owned) by village electrification committees. These elected committees are guided 
by national laws governing development committees. Although mass meetings are held it is not 
clear what role they play besides providing a forum for the committee to deal with problems 
and promote the use of electricity. The village electrification committee are responsible for 
operation and maintenance. Technical assistance and equipment is provided by the outside 
agency where necessary. 
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In the literature consulted there was one example of community responsibility for consumer 
education. In Nepal community members, or 'motivators' were selected and trained by the 
utility, Butwal Power Company in order to build communication and teaching skills; ensure an 
understanding of the integrated development approach and . philosophy of the rural 
electrification project, and develop knowledge of technical issues such as tariffs, safety, use of 
cookers, household wiring (Inversin n.d.) 
Another form of community management in Nepal is the shareholder company, Salleri Chialsa 
Electricity Company, which acts as a distribution agent. The shareholders, the decision making 
body of the company, comprise the community members (373), the utility (31.53) and the 
Swiss Development Cooperation (31.53). Ad hoc committees in electrification areas have been 
formed to ensure effective communication between people and the company. 
The Indonesian photovoltaic programme had as one of its goals the provision of support for 
management capacity of the Local Organising Committee, which were usually existing local 
organisational structures. These committees were responsible for the administration and record 
keeping, repayment management and revenue collection, as well as management of 
maintenance (Cowan et al 1996). 
Finally, the Andhi Khola Hydel Rural Electrification Project has a system of management similar 
to South African. Management of the project rests with a public utility. User organisations are 
formed to provide co-ordination between the villagers and the public company, reads meters, 
collects and deposits monthly revenue, limited maintenance, and accepts applications from new 
customers. In addition, the user organisations have contributed towards local economic 
development and set up businesses, such as rice and flour mills. Although these local 
organisations have met with great success in Nepal, their existence is not widespread. 
3.3 South African water sector experience 
The Mvula Trust has a 'demand-responsive' approach to water supply, whereby water is 
supplied to communities upon invitation. It is through applying this philosophy that the Trust is 
able to promote a 'policy of community empowerment through the management and 
ownership by communities of their own development process' (Mvula Trust 1997a). This is 
achieved through support for local decision-making, control over finances and responsibility for 
operation, maintenance and repair payments. The projects have subsidy ceilings and cost-
sharing components. Partnerships with NGOs aJ:ld private sector are encouraged by Mvula 
Trust. · 
.~ .. 
One of the key functions of the trust is to build the capacity of local community organisation, 
through skills development and establishing appropriate management and incentive structures. 
Importantly, training accompanies the implementation of all projects, based on the philosophy 
that cost-effective, sustainable and effective development is secured by local consumers making 
decisions and managing their own development process. 
The trust provides money to water committees for management, under the supervision of the 
Trust's regional staff. Committees are tasked with local decision-making, control of finances and 
procurement and they take responsibility for the payment for water. 
According to the external evaluators report, there have been few instances of ' intentional and 
inadvertent abuse of this arrangement' (Blaxall et al 1996). However, other sources have 
shown that the process and commitment to capacity building does not guarantee success. 
The over-riding Mvula Trust principles of ownership and empowerment were recently 
threatened with the discovery of two cases of fraud on projects in north-western 
Mpumulanga. In both instances, individuals extracted unauthorised sums of money from 
the committee bank accounts, threatening the future of projects.... Mvula, as a public 
holder of money, needs to ensure that such actions are not allowed to continue 
unpunished and.these matters will be pursued with diligence .... Political intervention is 
required to ensure that law enforcement agencies do their job as the Trust has committed 
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over R 15 million to the province. Lawyers have also been instructed to institute civil 
proceedings against the two suspects. (Mvula Trust 1997b) 
One of the findings of the evaluation report was that the committees expressed the need for 
more support from the Trust's field staff. Of particular importance was the need for support and 
training about banking practices, constituting and running committees, salaries and fees, 
knowledge of rules and sanctions, that is, the financial and management functions of a water 
committee. 
In contrast to this, water supply projects of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF) have not been as successful. Although committed to community participation in the 
management of the projects it was found that the project steering committees, which included 
community representatives, were often established too late in the process, or lacked capacity 
and experience to steer difficult projects. Also, other CBOs were not included in the projects. 
For example, in the Kgobokwane project, the strong CBOs were bypassed during project 
planning and implementation. The local council, which lacked capacity and covered a very 
large area, took responsibility for the provision of water. However, it was not effective and it is 
considered to be necessary for links between the council and the CBO to be re-established. It is 
argued that successful service provision is strongly dependent on community-based 
organisation (Mvula Trust 1998). 
4 Establishing sustainable CBOs for rural electrification 
Establishing sustainable CBOs is not an easy task. Problems and difficulties often experienced 
have been discussed. This chapter will now tum to the insights, lessons and experiences which 
could guide the establishment of CBOs which are sustainable and accountable. 
4. 1 External inputs needed to support CBOs 
Sustainability versus self-sustaining 
Perhaps the most important insight to•. inform this work is that the concept of sustainability of 
CBOs does not mean that they are self-sustaining; In other words, external inputs are essential 
to effective operation of community-based organis_ption. This means that effort should be made 
to define the types of interaction and assistance which is required for long-term viability, rather 
than being concerned with how to enable community-based organisation to operate without 
any external inputs. A recent review of literafure and experience in the water sector has 
emphasised the point that the concept of sustainability is associated with long-lasting 
organisations (but also adaptable, flexible and able to change), and that to confuse 
sustainability with self-sustaining ignores the 'fundamental requirement' that CBOs must 
interact with government and external agencies on a regular basis (Meinzen-Dick et al 1997). 
In a review of World Bank experience in Asia, similar conclusions about the need for strong 
central support was made (World Bank 1996). This argument is corroborated by the experience 
in South Africa. The situation at T ambo shows that Eskom cannot absolve itself from 
responsibility for ensuring that an agent is able to fulfil his/her responsibilities: regular meetings, 
appropriate accounting systems, regular reconciliation of the books and revenue collected and 
training of the agent should be facilitated by Eskom. Perhaps the most important lesson 
concerns the critical need for mechanisms to ensure that vending agents or customer service 
representatives are supported and supervised. According to Len de Villiers (1998) and his 
colleagues, the key to the success of the vending agents and the customer service 
representatives is community involvement and supervision. 
Building the capacity of CBO 
Training of CBO members is an important component of the support required of the external 
agency. Where capacity building has not occurred, both in South Africa, and abroad, it has 
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been found that the organisations do not survive. Developing and strengthening the capacity of 
people in CBO cannot be achieved through the application of blueprint formulas. Needs will 
differ from one community to the next - both the content and approach to building capacity 
should be dictated by the needs in that particular locality (Gerger & Gullberg 1997). The types 
of training include leadership, management, technical (including tariffs), financial (including 
banking practices), as well as constituting and running committees. 
External mechanisms for accountability 
In Vereeniging, Eskom will not set up vending agent if the control measures have not put in 
place: 
We have revenue control which is supported by reconciliation and credit control. We 
have supervisors which check the paypoints every day. With regard to the cashiers and 
agents there is procedural compliance and control. With regard to the agents there are 
contrpcts in place and there are attempts made to ensure that they are complied with. 
(De Villiers 1998) 
Due to the difficulty of keeping vending agents accountable some people feel it would be better 
to employ the agents. It is felt that the risk of job loss would prevent the duplicity of the agents 
(Baloyi 1998). Others disagree: 
You don't need to employ people to prevent fraud. The key is control. Although there is 
agreement that Agency agreements have to be tailor made, there are certain non-
negotiable essentials. The first, there has to be control over staff and agents. And 
secondly, you need to have some form of collection of the money. (De Villiers 1998) 
In rural areas, especially those which are far from urban areas with their banking systems, 
tarred roads and fidelity Guards, it may be more difficult to implement such systems of control. 
However, ensuring that vending agents use the appropriate financial accounting systems, are 
able to bank money regularly and are visited regularly by Eskom staff seem to be the basic 
requisites for maintaining financial accountability. 
Utility staff 
In the Eskom regional offices where there is recognition of the importance of supervision and 
support, staff have been trained and managemei:it systems have been set in place to enable 
them to do this. There is a need for committed ·staff to look after the agents, but this is not 
always happening. Eskom staff, including Eiectrowise advisors, have pointed to the 
inadequacies in the training which some of the electrowise advisors and other community 
workers receive. Inasmuch as there is a need to support CBOs, whether vending agents or 
customer service representatives, there is also a need to support, supervise and manage Eskom 
staff who are to undertake this work. 
Eskom has found that it is important to source Eskom staff who are to manage, supervise, 
support and train vending agents and other CBOs, from the communities in which they will 
work (Baloyi 1998; Moiloe 1998; de Villiers 1998). Further, it was emphasised that where these 
Eskom staff enjoyed political credibility, negotiations and difficulties were more easily resolved: 
It is important to create an understanding of the areas we electrify. Evaton was a totally 
no-go area. Prior to 1992 I dealt with customers who were white - very easy. I didn't 
have the ability to work in townships as we didn't understand the dynamics. We burnt 
our fingers a few times. The employment of guys with political credibility has helped 
enormously. In 1992 we started to employ people from the area. We had to get the 
community together- there were no jobs. Cars were being hi-jacked. (De Villiers 1998) 
There are a number of accounts of experiences which corroborate this view. Situations where 
only Eskom staff members who have political credibility and experience have been able to 
resolve potentially explosive situations are common. Where the desire for electricity is strong 
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and political struggles to gain access to it frequent, it is essential that staff members have the 
requisite negotiation skills. 
Eskom staff members who live in communities where Eskom has electrified often suffer from 
bum out due to the demands placed on them by community members. For instance, the 
service structure in the Vereeniging townships operates beyond working hours, with Eskom staff 
being called out to deal with customer complaints and queries at any time of the day or night. 
In order to support this level of customer service, the staff members are encouraged to take 
leave whenever they need it. 
4.2 Inside the CBO 
Possible roles and functions 
As discussed in the previous sections there are a number of operation, maintenance and 
administrative functions which can be fulfilled by the CBOs. In South Africa the main 
experience has been with the de.volution of the revenue collection function to CBOs or 
individuals. The devolution of other customer service functions, such as meter readings, billing, 
information dissemination and dealing with customer complaints and queries is also possible. 
There is also great potential to train local CBOs to educate people about the safe and efficient 
use of electricity. 
It seems that there is consensus in Eskom about not devolving the role of disconnecting non-
paying customers to local agents. In some cases, where agents. do the physical disconnection, 
they are not responsible for making the decision about which households will be cut off. The 
reason for this is that it is an issue which can easily become 'politicised', as it is concerned with 
controlling and withholding access to electricity. There is a great potential for this function to 
become subsumed in broader power struggles. This may result in the uneven implementation 
of a disconnection policy, where some people are penalised and others not, depending on their 
allegiances. 
With the exception of low voltage maintenance functions, maintenance of grid electricity 
systems is also not considered a viable function to. devolve to a local agent, mainly because the 
electricity environment is dangerous - Eskom remains legally responsible for the safety of its 
sub-contractors. Although low-voltage maintenance was devolved to the Maf efe Electricity 
Agency with good results, other Eskom managers felt that the risks of devolution were too great. 
On the other hand, off grid-electricity maintenance is considered to be an essential function of 
CBOs or individuals. Without this it is unlikely that off-grid programmes will be sustainable. 
Notwithstanding the problems related to the maintenance of grid-systems and undertaking 
disconnections, it is possible to devolve a number of functions. However, it is not possible to 
spell out which roles and functions should be devolved in a rural electrification programme in 
South Africa, for the reason that local conditions should inform the nature, role and function of 
CBOs. This can be achieved through community participation and social analysis of the 
community and its organisational structures, history and power processes. It is not appropriate 
to have fixed ideas of what functions will be devolved to communities as the conditions within 
that locality may mitigate against success. 
Local conditions inform type of organisation 
Another significant lesson from the Vereeniging experience was that it is important for the local 
conditions to inform the exact form of any community-based agency which is being set up. In 
some instances, it is not possible to establish CBOs; in others, due perhaps to a strong tradition 
of community-based involvement in development, it is possible to extend the basic functions to 
an established CBO. This was corroborated by a study of effective CBOs in the water sector 
where it was found that the most effective and sustainable organisations were those that were 
adapted to local conditions and which did not impose a blueprint organisational design 
(Meinzen-Dick et al 1997). This does not mean that it is not possible to have some consistency 
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of rules However, attention to the conditions of the local environment which either constrain or 
enable particular organisational forms and functions is critical. 
There are a number of other insights gained from this water sector study about the nature of 
CBOs which are helpful: 
• Organisations which were older were more stable than newer organisations which still have 
to prove themselves. Even where CBOs are inactive they can easily be prompted into 
action, either through internal or external mechanisms. 
• Existing organisations usually have established rules and practice which people are familiar 
with, often suit local conditions and which can be built on. In the water sector it has been 
found that it is more successful to work with an existing organisation, even if it is informal 
and is not concerned with water, rather than attempting to replace it. 
• Organisations which are able to change and adapt their operation and governance in 
response to new circumstances are more likely to ensure their sustainability. 
• It seems that, where the impetus for the establishment of an organisation originated from 
within the community rather than from outside intervention, if.is likely to be sustainable as 
it enables 'ownership' of the project. Although preferable, it does not preclude effective 
organisations which are initiated by outsiders (Meinzen-Dick et al 1997). 
Community mechanisms to ensure accountability 
There are a number of ways in which communities can be involved in keeping CBOs 
accountable. It is not sufficient just to involve communities in the election of people to these 
positions. Constituting a higher decision-making authority, such as an annual general meeting 
or a board, are ways of involving community members. Although important, it is also clear that 
these mechanisms do not necessarily guarantee that the organisation will be accountable. 
Success is largely dependent on the capacity of community members to participate act~vely in 
this ta5k. The establishment of transparent rules and the provision of sufficient and appropriate 
information will assist in this task: 
When the entire community knows how the system should work, who should benefit, 
and what each member's responsibilities are, any deviation from this becomes 
immediately apparent. (Watson et al 1997: ps) 
An interesting alternative to Eskom's system of cimtrol is the auditing of CBO finances by its 
members in an irrigation system in Nepal. This pas proven effective in eliminating fraud and 
ensuring members' confidence in handling funds (Meinzen-Dick et al 1997). 
It is possible that other ways of involving community members in keeping committees 
accountable could be developed together with community members. It is however, critical that 
there is a separation between the governance and technical roles. The governance roles 
concern the running of the organisation, while technical roles concern the day to day running of 
the system. At Mafefe, these roles were unclear and conflated as the Kgoshi and the electricity 
committee were often involved in the day-to-day operation of the electricity agency. Where 
these roles are conflated and unclear it is difficult to ensure accountability. 
Incentives to participate 
The provision of incentives to participate in CBOs was observed to be important in the long-run 
sustainability of these organisations in the water sector. It was suggested that people participate 
on the basis of gains and benefits. In the water sector these have included tangible physical 
improvement in the system, increased reliability of water supply, control over water, resolution 
of conflict and acquiring greater influence in decision-making (Meinzen-Dick et al 1997). 
Cash incentives have been used to stimulate the efficacy of CBOs. The Mvula Trust initially 
provided an operation, maintenance and repair incentive to communities who had successfully 
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maintained the project for six months after completion. The bonus was derived from monthly 
payments (R4 at Morapalala) made by the community (Mvula Trust June 1996). 
In some co-operatives in Bolivia it was found that volunteer positions, such as being a member 
of a board which oversees the operation of the co-operative, placed a burden on people. As the 
responsibilities, time and effort outweighed the benefits of being a member, there were few 
people who were willing to take over these duties, even though the co-operative bye-laws 
stipulated that people members change every year. (Gerger & Gullberg 1997). 
Power relations within.CBO 
As has been argued above, communities are not homogenous: social relations of power, such 
as gender and class, differentiate community members. CBOs most often reproduce the social 
stratifications in that community. In other words, positions of power are more than likely to be 
occupied by wealthier, more powerful individuals (usually men). It has been argued that by 
including marginal groups, such as women and poorer people, in CBOs a platform has been 
provided which 'can increase the bargaining power of less powerful members, including 
women, by explicitly including them in the process' (Sara in Watson 1997). However, this is not 
always the case. There is sufficient evidence from both Tambe and Mafefe which suggests that 
women on committees often do not contribute as equals. Furthermore, there are often 
inequalities in access to waged work. Women are more likely to fill positions which have low 
status and are unpaid (James 1997). It is imperative that mechanisms are put in place to 
mitigate against unequal division of labour and wages in committees. 
It is important to point out that strategies or quota systems which ensure that both men and 
women are equally represented and rewarded do not always have the desired outcome. Take 
the example of community educators or motivators in Nepal: although it was felt important to 
hire women as motivators, single women were 'not available for outside employment'. A 
decision to employ couples was taken on the basis that it would be easier to accomplish both 
the work within the household and that for the utility. However, it was found that 
[w]omen members of the team have not been released from their household chores to 
the extent that had been envisioned. They are often overworked and tired and, possibly 
as a consequence of this, occasionally show less interest than would be desirable. Some 
have since resigned; others have negotiated workable schedules at home. (Inversin n.d.: 
44) ,, 
Instead of enjoying the benefits of earning money;:this work has added to some of the women's 
workload. While this is does not mean that these"'sorts of initiatives should not be implemented 
it does raise important questions about implementing gender equity strategies without building 
the capacity of women to negotiate and challenge the relations of power which enforce the 
unequal division of labour within households. 
Having an inclusive membership is no guarantee that CBOs will not be taken over by local 
political elites. For example, in the Philippines local leaders in government and business were 
over-represented on boards, and the mechanisms designed to ensure that the members of the 
co-operatives were able to participate in decision-making were disregarded. It was found that 
board members tried to pre-empt any impact which the members of co-operatives would have: 
participants in annual general meetings were screened and attendance was limited to a few; 
and rather than eliciting members' opinions, the views of the board were presented at meetings. 
The co-operative boards and the national utility feared the impact of local political forces and 
responded by impeding particip~tion. In one instance where a board had been in office for a 
longer period than was desirable it took ' a strong locally dissident group, a court order and a 
push from President Marcos' to ensure that elections of the board took place. 
The political dynamic then is between a managerial group under fairly strong central 
control and local political groups. Within the overall national plan for electrification, the 
competition is over who will get electricity, when and for how much. (Mandel 1980: C-2) 
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Such occurrences have led to writers on rural water supply rural electrification arguing for the 
de-politicisation of service delivery. One of the recommendations which is made is that it is 
often advantageous to exclude local and regional politicians {Meinzen-Dick et al 1997). 
However, given that it is impossible to separate politics from 'development' {see James 1998) it 
is unlikely that such observations are appropriate for South Africa. As Crawford Cousins (1997: 
21) notes: 
At the level of highest abstraction, 'politics' is the way in which the multi-layered struggle 
over the allocation of scarce resources between subject positions who do not face each 
other as equals in society is conducted. In South Africa, electricity is a powerful symbol of 
access and privilege .... In rural areas electrification is a significant potential resource with 
unknown {but imagined) advantages and unanticipated outcomes which only the 
experience of electrification and its effects can provide. As the insertion of a valued and 
highly symbolic service - power - it is an intervention into a local political process 
contained within a complex history of land use and dispossession, of complicity with and 
resistance to authority at community, regional or national level . 
5 Implications for the electricity utility 
One of the. most important findings to emerge from this study is that building sustainable CBOs 
does not mean that they will be self-sustaining. While devolving certain operational and 
administration functions to CBOs offers the potential to save costs, it does not mean that utility 
staff can adopt a hands-off approach. Constant contact, support, assistance and training of the 
members of CBOs is essential. Ironically, cost savings will only be achieved if this support is 
given. Money rolling, theft, fraud and poor customer service have been found to occur when 
utility support and training has been lacking. However, as with the conclusions in James 
(1998), it is necessary to makes some comments about an institutional culture which could 
support this. It is pertinent to ask the question whether Eskom is the appropriate institution to 
be building the capacity and supporting CBOs. 
Getting the institutional culture 'right' ·· · 
One of the major implications of building CBOs is that fieldstaff have to become facilitators and 
organisers. While such tasks may be more traditionally associated with NGOs or unions, closer 
examination of the way in which Eskom works irt'. some regions shows that community liaison 
staff have been operating in this fashion for quite some time - such as is the case in Eskom's 
Vereeniging SACs office. Furthermore, there is a need to be flexible when dealing with the 
fieldstaff. Working closely with communities in a facilitative fashion is demanding and 
exhausting work. Different ways of supporting this work must be developed. 
Experience in the water sector has shown that, despite the acceptance of the important role 
CBOs can play, the capacity and will of the service provider staff does not often exist {Meinzen-
Dick et al 1997). It has been found that there are constraints and resistance to establishing and 
building sustainable CBOs. Very often this is because the institutional culture can often not 
support this work. It remains unacknowledged, is not adequately paid for and it is often seen as 
an additional responsibility. One of the main reasons for this is that the impetus behind 
establishing CBOs is the desire for cost-savings. However, as 'powerful as the financial 
pressures on the government [are] ... they are unlikely to affect the behaviour of agency staff 
without structural changes that convey the appropriate incentives {Meinzen-Dick et al 1997: 
56). 
Clearly, this resonates with Eskom where the drive to establish community-based organisation 
and devolve responsibility stems largely from the need to reduce costs. Some mechanisms. 
which have been implemented in the water sector include the following: 
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• Staff should be remunerated appropriately and salaries should be affected by the system's 
performance, and promotions and special honours should also be applied to this work. In 
. other words this work should be accorded value. 
• Working with CBOs should be part of staff's job description, with appropriate resources 
given to this function and performance evaluations based on this work. Publicising 
performance plans ,in settlements has been one way in which water sector agencies in Asia 
have managed to enhance performance as the villagers keep the fieldstaff accountable. 
Can Eskom do it? 
To institute a practice which will build the capacity of CBOs to fulfil operation and 
administrative functions in rural communities will be difficult for Eskom due to its organisational 
culture and form. We would propose that Eskorri does not constitute electricity agencies, such 
as those at Tambe and Mafefe, without undergoing organisational change which could support 
this work. Specialist skills, which are not necessarily found in an electricity utility, are required. 
Furthermore, this work requires more time. At present, staff working in communities are over-
stretched and they do not have any more time to spend in communities. This would mean that 
Eskom would have to employ more staff to fulfil these responsibilities and undertake to train all 
staff members to enable them to do this work. In keeping with the recommendations made 
elsewhere (James 1998), we would recommend that Eskom subcontracts these functions to an 
organisation, such as an NGO, which has the organisational culture and skills to support CBOs. 
Eskom would retain its marketing function and controls over revenue collection. 
While Eskom managed to devolve. operational functions to close corporations in Vereeniging, 
its urban location certainly makes support and training more possible than in some rural areas. 
It may be possible to duplicate this arrangement elsewhere. However, the flexibility of the 
Eskom office, the particular skilled fieldstaff and the conditions in the community have together 
ensured success of these ventures. We would caution against adopting this model as a blueprint 
for devolving certain operation and administration functions to CBOs. Careful analysis of the 
particular locality and staff requirements to support this is required. 
However, there does seem to be the possibility of improving the sustainability, accountability 
and efficacy of vending agents. A number of SACs offices have implemented mechanisms 
· which have achieved this. These include close support, strict financial controls and training. 
It is worthwhile stressing that the restructuring of the electricity diStribution industry offers an 
opportunity to shift the practice of the technical delivery of electricity to prioritise and resource 
an investment in human development, through improving the approach to delivery as well as 
emphasising the need to build the capacity of rural people. As argued, resources will have to be 
allocated to this end if changes in practice are to occur. 
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